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LOGICAL INCONSISTENCIES IN THE SEC's
ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING: GUIDELINES
FOR A DEFINITION
Insider trading is the buying or selling of securities based on knowledge
acquired from material, nonpublic information.' The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) adopted rule lOb-5 (10b-5) pursuant to authority
granted in section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act) allowing the SEC to regulate fraudulent practices in the sale of
securities. 2 The SEC has used the broad antifraud provisions of 10b-5 to
regulate insider trading.3 The statutory definition of traditional insiders
includes directors, officers, and ten percent beneficial shareholders of the
1. See S. ARKIN, TRADING ON INSIDE INFORv AnoN 17 (1984) (noting that trading
securities while possessing material, nonpublic, corporate information constitutes insider trad-
ing). Information is material if it might influence a reasonable investor's investment decision.
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). Material information includes
statements made in connection with proxy solicitations and tender offers. Greenfield v.
Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1984). Nonpublic information is news that the
corporation has not made available to the investing public. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968).
2. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1981) (Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)
prohibiting, inter alia, manipulative or deceptive practices designed to contravene securities
laws). Section 10(b) of the '34 Act empowers the SEC to adopt rules that condemn deceptive
practices in the purchase or sale of securities. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461, 463 (2d Cir. 1952); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986) (describing fraudulent practices in
securities markets). The SEC adopted rule 10b-5 to combat fraud in securities transactions.
See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RuiLE lOb-5 § 1 (1985). Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part:
b;' 'It shall be unlawful for any person . . . by the use of any means or instrumentality
of interstate commerce . . . (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud (c) to
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale or securities.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986). Although designed to combat fraud, lOb-5 provides no
direct prohibition against fraudulent insider trading. See Karsch, The Insider Trading Sanctions
Act: Incorporating A Market Information Definition, 6 J. oF CoUP. Bus. & CAPITAL MKT.
LAW 283 (1984) (stating that § 10(b) and rule lob-5 set forth general antifraud provisions
rather than flat prohibitions against insider trading). The judiciary has interpreted lOb-5
broadly to assist the SEC's regulation of insider trading. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (finding that Congress intended courts to interpret securities
laws broadly); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d
Cir. 1974) (holding that flexible judicial interpretation of lOb-5 helps SEC regulate insider
trading).
3. See Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates Confidential Information May Be
Charged With Securities Fraud, 31 DE PAuL L.Rnv. 849, 850 (1982) (noting that lOb-5 is
primary provision that SEC employs to combat insider trading). The SEC enacted lOb-5 to
protect the investing public and the integrity of the stockmarket. See S. ARKIN, supra note 1,
at 61 (indicating that SEC enacted lOb-5 because abuses of insider trading undermine integrity
and fairness of capital markets).
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issuing corporation. 4 Under rule 10b-5 traditional insiders have an affirm-
ative duty to disclose material, nonpublic information before they trade or
to refrain from trading on the basis of the inside information.5 Although
agreeing that lob-5 liability extends to traditional insiders, courts cannot
decide whether lOb-5 liability extends to outsiders trading on inside infor-
mation. 6 Critics have suggested that Congress should enact a rule specifically
defining the scope of lOb-5 liability.
7
The development of the role of 10b-5 in insider trading cases by the
SEC and the courts began with the SEC's decision in In re Cady Roberts.8
In In re Cady Roberts the SEC considered whether an outsider who received
material, nonpublic information concerning a company inherited the same
disclose or refrain obligations as a traditional insider. 9 In Cady Roberts the
defendant stockbroker received information from a director of a corporation
that the corporation intended to reduce quarterly dividends.10 The stock-
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1976) (defining traditional insiders); see also Note, Securities
Regulation- The Duty To Disclose Under the Securities and Exchange Commission's Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 7 WsTN. N.E. L.Rav. 111, 114 (1984) (indicating that definition of
traditional insiders stated in Section 16 of the '34 Act).
5. See Langevoort, Insider Trading And The Fiduciary Principle" A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAUF. L.REv. 1, 2 (1982) (stating that duty to disclose or refrain primarily
associated with lOb-5); see also Speed v. TransAmerica Corp., 99 F.Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.
1951) (requiring traditional insiders to disclose inside information or refrain from trading);
Freeman, The Insider Trading Sanctions Bill-A Neglected Oppurtunity, 4 PACE L. REv. 221,
224 (1984) (stating that traditional insiders fall within scope of lOb-5 liability).
6. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983) (refusing to subject tippee receiving
material information from corporate insider to disclose or refrain rule); Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (holding that financial printer did not incur lob-5 liability);
United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1036 (2d Cir. 1986) (extending lOb-5 liability to
Wall Street Journal reporter for criminal violations of 10b-5); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197,
203 (2d Cir. 1984) (extending insider trading liability to financial printer charged with rule lob-5
violations); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981) (subjecting investment
bankers to lOb-5 liability); Shapiro v. Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 245
(2d Cir. 1974) (subjecting tippees to lOb-5 liability); supra note 4 and accompanying text (noting
that judiciary applies disclose or refrain obligations to traditional insiders).
7. See Karsch, supra note 2, at 297 (urging Congress to include definition of insider
trading in Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984); Freeman supra note 5, at 222 (urging
government to enact specific statute broadening activities that constitute insider trading);
Brodsky, Insider Trading and the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: New Wine Into New
Bottles, 41 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 921, 922 (1984) (arguing for a definition of insider trading
to supplement increased sanctions included in Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984); Block
& Barton, Insider Trading- The Need For Legislation, 10 SEc. REG. L.J. 350, 371 (1983)
(demonstrating need for insider trading definition to combat insider trading adequately).
8. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See Hazen, Tim LAW OF SacusRTias REGULATION, 482 (1985)
(indicating that SEC used Cady Roberts to state scope of outsider's lob-5 liability).
9. In re Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 907-08.
10. Id. at 909. The corporation in Cady Roberts developed a new type of engine, and
the development increased the price of the corporation's stock. Id. The stockbroker purchased
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broker sold approximately 7000 shares of the issuing corporation's stock
without disclosing that the corporation intended to reduce dividends to the
investing public." The SEC found that the stockbroker's trades violated
lOb-5(3) because the broker had access to information intended solely for
a corporate purpose and not for personal benefit.' 2 In extending lOb-5
liability to the stockbroker, the SEC in Cady Roberts stated that traditional
insiders do not comprise the only class of persons subject to disclose or
refrain obligations. 3 The SEC found that an outsider inherits the disclose
or refrain obligations of traditional insiders by occupying a position that
affords the outsider access to corporate information.' 4 The SEC noted the
inherent unfairness involved in trading on information that is not available
to the investing public.' Accordingly, the SEC in Cady Roberts held that
outsiders who occupy a position giving access to inside corporate information
incur the same disclose or refrain obligations as traditional insiders.' 6
While the SEC in Cady Roberts recognized that principles of fairness were
a secondary factor that courts could consider when determining whether an
outsider incurred lOb-5 liability, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co. '7 narrowed the scope of lOb-5 liability by relying solely on
principles of fairness to extend lOb-5 liability to outsiders.' In Texas Gulf
Sulphur the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit consid-
ered whether officers, employees, and their tippees were liable under rule
lOb-5.19 In Texas Gulf Sulphur the officers, employees, and tippees bought
shares of Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. before disclosing the results of a successful
ore exploration to the investing public. 20 The trial court held that the chief
stock in the company. Id. The board of directors of the corporation had paid the shareholders
a dividend of S.625 for three consecutive quarters. Id. at 909. The corporation decided,
however, to reduce the fourth quarter dividend. Id. A director of the corporation informed
the stockbroker about the board's decision to reduce divedends before the corporation publicly
announced the decision. Id. The director of the corporation was a partner of the stockbroker.
Id.
11. 1d. In Cady Roberts the stockbroker sold the stock for clients. Id. The SEC,
however, found that the stockbroker sold some of the stock in the corporation for the
stockbroker's wife. Id.
12. Id. at 912.
13. Id. at 912. The SEC in Cady Roberts stated that disclose or refrain obligations
extend to any person who enters into a relationship giving access to insider information because
of the inherent unfairness of permitting persons with access to insider information to take advantage
of less informed investors. Id.
14. Id;. see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (SEC in Cady Roberts based
stockbroker's liability on existence of relationship between stockbroker and issuing company).
15. Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912.
16. Id.
17. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
18. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text (noting that SEC in Cady Roberts
based outsider's lOb-5 liability on existence of relationship and fairness).
19. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 839.-40.
20. Id. at 845.
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geologist and an officer of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. had violated lob-
5, but dismissed the complaint against the remainder of the defendants. 2'
On appeal the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur relied on the inherent
fairness of extending equal access to information to all investors to state a
broad prohibition against insider trading.? Stating that all investors must
have equal access to material market information, the Second Circuit in
Texas Gulf Sulphur found that "anyone" who possesses inside information
either must disclose the information or must refrain from trading in the
security. 23 Accordingly, the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur affirmed
the conviction of the two defendants and reversed the dismissal of the other
defendants.24
Years after Cady Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulphur the United States
Supreme Court began to narrow the scope of lOb-5 liability.25 In Chiarella
v. United States26 the Supreme Court considered whether rule lob-5 could
apply to a financial printer.27 In Chiarella the government charged Chiarella
with criminal violations of 1Ob-5 for trading on the undisclosed knowledge
of pending takeover attempts. 28 In his position as financial printer Chiarella
had access to documents that announced corporate takeover bids.29 The
Supreme Court in Chiarella found that before disclosing the information to
the public Chiarella deduced the names of target companies and then
purchased stock in the target companies.30 Stating that Chiarella was not a
corporate insider, the Court found that Chiarella had no fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of the issuing company.3' The Court stated that the mere
21. Id. at 839. The trial court held that two of the defendants connected with the Texas
Gulf Sulphur corporation's drilling violated lOb-5. Id. The trial court, however, found that the
other defendants did not violate 1Ob-5 because the information was not material. Id.
22. See id. (stating that Congress intended lOb-5 to reinforce investor's justifiable
expectation of equal access to market information).
23. See id. at 848 (to eliminate potential for unfair trading Second Circuit extended
lOb-5 liability to anyone who had inside information). The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf
Sulphur also stated that lOb-5 liability extends to traders who do not qualify as traditional
insiders. Id.
24. Id.
25. See infra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Supreme Court
narrowed lOb-5 liability by requiring fiduciary relationship between outsider and shareholders
of issuing company); cf. supra notes 9-16 and accompanying text (SEC in Cady Roberts
extended lOb-5 liability to outsider who had business relationship with issuing corporation);
supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text (Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur extended lOb-
5 liability to any outsider who had inside information).
26. 445 U.S. 222 (1983).
27. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 224. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
after the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's conviction of Chiarella for lob-5 violations.
Id. at 225.
28. Id. at 224. The Supreme Court in Chirarella stated that Chiarella made approximately
$30,000 from his trades. Id.
29. Id. at 224. The Chiarella Court noted that the takeover announcements arrived at
the printer's office with the corporate names concealed. Id.
30. Id. at 224.
31. See id. at 231, 235 (holding that financial printer received inside information
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possession of material, nonpublic information did not subject Chiarella to
lOb-5 liability.12 The Supreme Court in Chiarella held that outsiders do not
incur lOb-5 liability absent a fiduciary duty to the issuing corporation.
3
In Dirks v. SEC14 the Court extended the Chiarella fiduciary duty
concept to tippees trading on inside information. 3 The petitioner in Dirks,
a broker-dealer of securities, specialized in offering investment analysis
concerning insurance companies. 36 Dirks received information that an in-
surance company, Equity Funding, fraudulently had overstated corporate
earnings.3 7 While investigating the alleged fraud, Dirks conveyed information
concerning the fraud to clients and persuaded the clients to sell their Equity
Funding stock.38 Stating that public policy did not dictate that all market
participants have equal access to market information, the Supreme Court
determined that Dirks was not liable under rule lOb-5. 39 The Court in Dirks
held that tippees may trade on inside information unless the tippee has
reason to know that in disclosing the information the insider breached a
fiduciary duty to the corporation.
4 0
concerning acquiring company rather than inside information concerning target company). The
Chiarella Court held that Chiarella did not owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
target corporation. Id.
32. See id. at 233 (holding that financial printer had no affirmative duty to disclose
inside information absent fiduciary duties to issuing company). The Court in Chiarella refused
to adopt the market information theory which states that all investors deserve equal access to
relevant market information. Id. The Court found that the market information theory hinders
legitimate investment activities. Id. at 234.
33. Id. at 232.
34. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
35. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. at 658.
36. Id. at 648.
37. Id. at 649. Dirks visited the Equity Funding headquarters to interview management
and employees about the allegations of fraud. Id. While management denied the allegations,
lower level employees substantiated the allegations of fraud. Id.
38. Id. The Supreme Court in Dirks found that although Dirks did not own any Equity
Funding stock, Dirks did receive commissions from the brokerage business. Id.
39. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.
40. See id. at 659 (holding that tippee liability imposed only if tippee received information
improperly). The Court established a test for tippee liability that examined whether the insider
received any benefit from tipping the information. Id. The Court noted that tippees incur
fiduciary duties to disclose or refrain when the tipper conveys the inside information improperly.
Id. at 660. The Court did recognize, however, that certain outsiders obtain inside information
from corporate insiders in situations which do not require the insider to breach the fiduciary
duty to the corporation. Id. at 655. The Court noted that under the constructive insider theory
certain outsiders inherit fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the issuing corporation because
the constructive insiders occupy a special relationship with the issuing corporation. Id. The
United States District Court for the Central District of California adopted the Supreme Court's
constructive insider theory in SEC v. Lund. See Lund, 570 F.Supp. 1397, 1400 (C.D. Cal.
1983) (considering whether outsider acquiring corporate information inherits disclose or refrain
obligations when inside tipper did not breach fiduciary duty). The Lund court found that a
director of a corporation legitimately conveyed information about a pending joint venture to
Lund. SEC v. Lund, 570 F.Supp. at 1399. The corporate insider conveyed the inside information
1987]
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The Chiarella and Dirks decisions required the SEC to prove that
outsiders trading on inside information breached a fiduciary duty to the
shareholders of the issuing company or, alternatively, that the outsider had
reason to believe that the insider breached a fiduciary duty before the SEC
can establish a case of tippee liability.4' To circumvent the burden of proof
required by the Chiarella fiduciary duty test, the SEC began prosecuting
cases under the misappropriation theory.42 Under the misappropriation
theory courts examine whether the outsider improperly received inside
information by breaching a fiduciary relationship with an employer.4 3 Courts
applying the misappropriation theory do not examine whether the outsider
improperly received inside information from the issuing corporation.44 Under
the misappropriation theory the outsider's misappropriation constitutes a
breach of his duty of confidentiality to his employer rather than a breach
of the outsider's duty to the shareholders of the issuing corporation. 45 Thus,
the misappropriation theory allows the SEC to circumvent the requirement
that the outsider breach a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the issuing
company.4 6 The misappropriation theory applies to anyone who improperly
to Lund to ascertain whether Lund would be interested in joining the venture. SEC v. Lund,
570 F.Supp. at 1399 The district court in Lund found that Lund entered into a special
relationship with the company and had access to information intended for a corporate purpose.
SEC v. Lund, 570 F.Supp. at 1403. The Lund court could not base lOb-5 liability on tippee
liability because the insider legitimately conveyed the inside information. SEC v. Lund, 570
F.Supp. at 1402. However, the Lund court held that the outsider inherited the disclose or
refrain obligations of a traditional insider when the outsider acquired knowledge about a
pending joint venture from a relationship with the issuing corporation. SEC v. Lund, 570
F.Supp. at 1402.
41. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659 (requiring that insider tipping information to outsider
breach fiduciary duty to corporation before subjecting tippee of insider to lOb-5 liability);
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (holding that outsiders do not incur lob-5 liability absent fiduciary
duties to issuing corporation); see also supra notes 34-48 and accompanying text (demonstrating
how Court applied fiduciary duty test to narrow scope of lOb-5 liability).
42. See United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d at 15 (stating that government structured
indictment to meet deficiencies of indictment of Chiarella).
43. See Morris, Misappropriation As An Alternative Basis For Section 10(b) Liability,
61 Cm.[-]Kaur L. REv. 693, 694 (1985) (indicating that misappropriation theory regulates out-
siders trading on inside information); see also United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028
(2d Cir. 1986) (focusing on reporter's breach of silence to employer, court affirmed conviction
of reporter for violating l0b-5); United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1981) (sub-
jecting investment bank employees to lOb-5 liability because employees breached duty to employer);
SEC v. Musella, 578 F.Supp. 425, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that misappropriation theory
extends lOb-5 liability to outsiders). The SEC bases the misappropriation theory on the out-
sider's theft of information from his employer. See Note, An Outsider Who Misappropriates
Confidential Information May Be Charged With Securities Fraud, 31 DEPAuL L. REv. 849, 851
(1982) (demonstrating how SEC views misappropriation theory as vehicle to prevent trading on
stolen information).
44. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (indicating that courts applying misappropri-
ation theory do not examine whether outsider breached fiduciary duty to shareholders of issuing
company).
45. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 17.
46. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (demonstrating how misappropriation
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obtains and trades on material, nonpublic information.4 7 Courts have applied
the misappropriation theory to subject investment bankers, 48 financial print-
ers,49 sons, s0 and the manager of a law firm to the disclose or refrain rule
of lOb-5.5'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United
States v. Carpenter2 recently applied the misappropriation theory to a Wall
Street Journal (Journal) reporter who revealed information concerning future
articles that would appear in the Journal. 3 In Carpenter the reporter
investigated corporations for the "Heard on the Street" column (Heard
column) that he wrote for the Journal.5 4 The Heard column, a daily feature
in the Journal, offers investment advice on a stock or group of stocks.-,
The reporter also leaked the contents of the article to outside investors
before the articles appeared in the Journal.16 The Second Circuit in Carpenter
found that the reporter misappropriated material, nonpublic information
from the Journal in the form of the timing, content, and tenor of the
Heard column.17 The Carpenter court stated that the reporter's misappro-
priation of confidential prepublication information constituted a breach of
the reporter's duty of confidentiality to the Journal." Arguing that the
misappropriation theory applied only to persons who occupied positions as
insiders or quasi-insiders, the reporter maintained that the misappropriation
theory did not extend 10b-5 liability to persons who do not owe a fiduciary
theory switches focus of fiduciary duty from sellers of securities to employers of outsiders
trading on material, nonpublic information).
47. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In Chiarella Justice Burger
argued that disclose or refrain obligations attach to anyone who trades on the basis of
misappropriated information. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The SEC introduced the
misappropriation theory during oral argument in Chiarella. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236. The
Court in Chiarella, however, dismissed the misappropriation theory because the lower courts
had not instructed the jury on the misappropriation theory. Id.
48. See Newman, 664 F.2d at 15 (applying misappropriation theory to extend lob-5
liability to investment bankers).
49. See SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 203 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that financial printer
violated lOb-5 by misappropriating information that belonged to his employer).
50. See U.S. v. Reed, 601 F.Supp. 685, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that son violated
lob-5 misappropriating information that belonged to his father).
51. See Musella, 578 F.Supp. at 431 (holding that manager of law firm violated lob-5
by revealing confidential information concerning corporate clients obtained from law firm).
52. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986).
53. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. The Second Circuit in Carpenter also found that the
reporter's conduct violated federal mail and wire fraud statutes. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. The district court concluded that the Heard column affected the stock market.
United States v. Winans, 612 F.Supp. 827, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
56. Id. The outside investors traded on the information before the Heard column
appeared in the Journal. Winans, 612 F.Supp. at 832. The reporter's agreement with the
outsiders, however, did not influence the reporter's column. Winans, 612 F.Supp at 832.
57. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026. The Carpenter court found that the reporter leaked
securities related information intended for publication in the Journal. Id.
58. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
1987]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:935
duty to the issuing corporation that the employer represents.5 9 The Second
Circuit in Carpenter, however, held that the reporter violated rule lOb-5
even though the reporter had no access to information belonging to the
issuing corporations discussed in the Heard columnn. 60 The Second Circuit
in Carpenter held that the misappropriation theory extended 10b-5 liability
to anyone who misappropriated nonpublic information and traded on the
basis of the information.
61
Whether applying the Supreme Court's fiduciary duty test or the mis-
appropriation theory the SEC must prove that the outsider breached a
fiduciary duty. 62 Many authorities believe that fiduciary standards do not
define the scope of lOb-5 liability adequately. 63 The commentators also
contend that fiduciary standards do not adequately deter insiders from
trading on material, nonpublic information. 4 In 1982 Congress considered
a bill to increase the sanctions against persons who violated the prohibitions
against insider trading and subsequently passed the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 1984 ('84 Act) to authorize the SEC to seek a monetary penalty
against the insider equal to three times the amount of the profit gained. 65
59. Id. at 1028. The reporter in Carpenter argued that the misappropriation theory
applied only to persons who had a business relationship with the issuing corporation and the
corporation's shareholders. Id.
60. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026 (court affirmed reporter's lOb-5 conviction on
reporter's misappropriation of Journal's publication schedule). The district court relied on a
Journal pamphlet which prohibited employees from disclosing the future contents of Journal
articles to outside sources. Winans, 612 F.Supp. at 839. The government conceded that the reporter
did not violate lOb-5 without the existence of the pamphlet. See Winans, 612 F.Supp. at 842
(district court recognized that reporter did not trade on inside information).
61. Id. at 1029. On appeal, the Supreme Court in Carpenter v. U.S. upheld the conviction
of the reporter on the mail and wire fraud statutes. Carpenter v. United States, .U.S.-,
108 S. Ct. 316 (1987). The Court in Carpenter, however, was split evenly over whether the
reporter's actions constituted a violation of lOb-5 under the misappropriation theory. Id. at -
108 S. Ct. at 320.
62. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (Supreme Court in Dirks and Chiarella
held that lob-5 liability required that outsider breach fiduciary duty to shareholders of issuing
corporation); supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text (discussing how misappropriation
theory extends lOb-5 liability to outsiders who breach fiduciary duty of confidentiality to
employers).
63. See Karsch, supra note 2, at 284 (noting that lob-5 cannot adequately regulate
outsiders trading on inside information, because lob-5 liability requires that outsider breach
fiduciary duty to shareholders of issuing corporation); Block & Barton, supra note 7, at 350
(describing inadequacy of fiduciary standard as prohibition of insider trading); Freeman, supra
note 5, at 222 (urging Congress to enact statute replacing fiduciary duty test as standard for
lOb-5). Members of Congress displayed concern over the inadequacy of the fiduciary standard
to deter insider trading. The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983: Hearings on S.910 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1984)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (After Chiarella, Senator D'Amato questioned SEC about effec-
tiveness of lOb-5).
64. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (indicating perception that lob-5 inadequate
to deter abuses of insider trading).
65. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(increasing sanctions for lob-5 violations). In passing the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 Congress empowered the SEC to impose on a trader violating 10b-5 a civil penalty not
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Proponents of the 1984 Act maintained that the threat of stiffer penalties
increased the enforcement power of the SEC to deter insider trading.6 6 The
1984 Act, however, contains no provisions defining the types of activities
that constitute insider trading6 According to the legislative history accom-
panying the 1984 Act, Congress did not believe that a definition of the
prohibitions against insider trading was necessary to accomplish the purpose
of the 1984 Act.65 Congress apparently accepted the SEC's contention that
present case law adequately defined the prohibitions against insider trading.
6 9
The SEC had argued that a definition embodying new terms and concepts
would provide loopholes for attorneys who defended persons accused of
violating the insider trading prohibitions.7 0 Although supporting the 1984
Act, many critics have contended that Congress' failure to include a defi-
nition clarifying the prohibitions against insider trading was a mistake.
7'
Commentators have stated that the increased sanctions of the 1984 Act
along with the SEC's vigorous enforcement of the insider trading laws
increased the risk and possible punishment of persons who trade on the
basis of material, nonpublic information.72 Commentators have contended
that, therefore, Congress should have incorporated into the '84 Act a
definition that specifically describes the types of activities that would subject
outsiders increased sanctions.7
3
to exceed three times the profit gained or the loss avoided. Id. Congress Act also increased
the criminal fine from $10,000 to $100,000. Id. Congress reasoned that the increased sanctions
would increase the deterrent effect of rule 10b-5. H.R. REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmt. NEws 2274, 2275 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
3551.
66. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 221 (noting that 1984 Act gives SEC additional
remedies to enforce laws against insider trading).
67. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(Congress did not include definition of insider trading); Karsch, supra note 2, at 284 (indicating
that 1984 Act did not include definition of insider trading).
68. See H.R. REP. No. 355, surpa note 65, at 14, 2287 (concluding that definition of
insider trading is unnecessary to increase sanctions against persons violating insider trading
laws).
69. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (indicating SEC's criticism of including
insider trading definition in 1984 Act).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 65, at 14, 2287 (stating definition of insider
trading would reduce flexibility and create new ambiguities). The SEC opposes a definition of
insider trading. See Senate Hearings, supra note 63, at 36. The SEC argued that an insider
trading definition would not add new clarity to lOb-5, would create new ambiguities, and
would reduce the SEC's flexibility. Id. at 36-37.
71. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (illustrating criticism of Congress' failure
to include definition of insider trading in 1984 Act).
72. See Brodsky, supra note 7, at 922 (stressing that need for definition is more urgent
because 1984 Act increased sanctions for violations of lOb-5).
73. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (noting that many critics urge Congress
to adopt definition of insider trading), Notwithstanding the failure of Congress to include a
definition of insider trading in the 1984 Act, the SEC has attempted to define insider trading
liability in the context of tender offers. 17 C.F.R. Section 240.14e-3 (1986). Under 14(e)-3,
anyone who has material, nonpublic information concerning a tender offer and who believes
that the information is acquired from the issuing corporation or from anyone acted on behalf
of the bidding corporation must disclose the information or refrain from trading. Id.
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Insider trading remains a major problem in the stockmarket despite the
increased sanctions of the 1984 Act and the SEC's increased enforcement
measures. 74 For example, on November 14, 1986, the SEC announced that
Ivan F. Boesky agreed to pay 100 million dollars to settle charges of insider
trading. 7 Boesky entered into an explicit profit-sharing agreement with Dennis
Levine, an investment banker representing the investment banking firm of
Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel).7 6 Leving agreed to convey inside infor-
mation concerning pending takeover bids to Boesky. n Boesky agreed to pay
Levine five percent of the profits Boesky relized from the inside information
concerning takeover bids. 78 The SEC barred Boesky from poarticipating further
in the stock market. 79 Before disclosing the Boesky settlement, however, the
SEC allowed Ivan F. Boesky & Co., L.P. (arbitrage fund) to liquidate
approximately 1.3 billion dollars worth of securities.
8
0
Many market participants claimed that Boesky's arbitrage fund received
an unfair advantage when the SEC allowed the arbitrage fund to trade on
the information of the Boesky case .8 The arbitrage fund liquidated stocks of
corporations rumored as takeover targets.82 Stock prices dropped, especially
in the companies buttressed by takeover rumors, after public disclosure of the
Boesky case. 83 Some market analysts have questioned whether the government
sanctioned insider trading when the SEC allowed the arbitrage fund to liquidate
the securities.Y
74. See Washington Post, Febuary 18, 1987, at F2, col.4 (reporting arrest of attorney
who tipped information concerning corporate restructuring); Washington Post, Febuary 12,
1987, at Fl, col. 4 (indicating that government charged stock traders at investment banking
firm with trading on inside information concerning corporate takeovers).
75. Wall St. J., November 17, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Ivan Boesky agreed to plead guilty to
a felony count carrying a prison term of one to five years. Id. Allegedly, Boesky is the most
widely known arbitrager in the stock market. Id.
76. Wall St. J., November 17, at 28, col. 1. The information that Levine conveyed to
Boesky concerned takeover targets. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Wall St. J., December 15, 1986, at 4, col. 1.
80. Id.
81. See id. (reporting public concern over propriety of Boesky selling securities before
public disclosure of SEC case); Wall St. J., November 20, 1986, at 3, col. I (noting public
dismay over SEC decision to allow Boesky to liquidate security holdings before disclosure).
82. See Wall St. J., November 20, 1986, at 3, col. 1 (indicating that Boesky arbitrage
fund traded securities in Time, Inc., USX Corp., Gillette Co., and other corporations rumored
as takeover companies).
83. Id.
84. Wall St. J., November 21, 1986, at 69, col. 3. The SEC defended its decision to
allow the arbitrage fund to trade on the news of the Boesky settlement by stating that the
fund did not misappropriate information. Wall St. J., December 15, 1986, at 4, col. 1. In
addition to stating that Boesky did not misappropriate any information, the SEC maintained
that the stock market could not accomodate the large volume of trading that would have
accompanied the disclosure of the Boesky case. Id. The SEC contended that the decision to
allow Boesky to liquidate the stocks actually helped the market, although some brokerage
houses disagreed. Id. The SEC contended that Boesky did not benefit from liquidating the
stocks. Id. SEC officials argued that Boesky hurt the arbitrage fund because the fund was not
able to take advantage of rising stock prices when the market rebounded. Id. Finally, the SEC
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The public outrage concerning the Boesky scandal emphasizes the need
to enact a congressional definition that defines insider trading clearly.8 5 The
Second Circuit in Carpenter imposed criminal liability on a journalist who
did not have inside information. s6 The SEC, however, permitted Boesky's
arbitrage fund to trade securities in the stockmarket on the material knowl-
edge of Boesky's settlement.87 The inconsistency created between the Car-
penter case and the Boesky settlement arguably decreased investor confidence
in the integrity of the stock market."s Inconsistencies in SEC enforcement
of the insider trading prohibitions distort the principles of lOb-5 liability.89
Present judicial interpretations of Rule lOb-5 liability do not dictate the types of
conduct that constitute insider trading.90 Furthermore, investors cannot
determine adequately the types of outsiders who will not incur the disclose
or refrain obligations of traditional insiders. 9' A definition establishing the
parameters of lOb-5 liability would provide guidance to investors contem-
plating trades based on material, nonpublic information. 92 Contrary to the
SEC's concern that a new definition would benefit attorneys defending
insider trading actions, a definition that clearly stated the prohibitions
against insider trading would help the SEC enforce the insider trading laws. 93
maintained that public disclosure of the case would hinder the SEC's ongoing investigation of
the insider trading scandal. Id.
85. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (illustrating public criticism of SEC
decision to allow Boesky's arbitrage fund to liquidate stocks).
86. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026; see supra note 60 and accompanying text (indicating
that reporter in Carpenter did not possess inside information).
87. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (demonstrating how SEC allowed
Boesky arbitrage fund to benefit from knowledge of SEC case against Boesky).
88. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (implying that public criticism of SEC
decision allowing Boesky to trade securities indicated lack of investor confidence in stock
market and SEC' power to regulate insider trading); cf. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026 (affirming
conviction of reporter who did not possess inside information).
89. Compare supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text (discussing how Boesky fund
traded on knowledge of SEC insider trading case against Boesky) with supra notes 53-61 and
accompanying text (noting that Carpenter court imposed lob-5 liability on reporter who did
not possess inside information).
90. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (illustrating inadequacy of lob-5 to define
scope of insider trading liability for outsiders).
91. Compare supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (Supreme Court in Dirks and Chirella
held that lOb-5 requires finding that outsider breached fiduciary duty to issuing company)
with supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text (indicating how SEC applied misappropriation
theory to extend lOb-5 liability to outsiders who did not have fiduciary obligations to issuing
company).
92. See Block & Barton, supra note 7, at 353 (illustrating ineffectiveness of lob-5 to
regulate outsiders trading on inside information). The prohibitions against outsiders trading
on inside information are ambiguous because lOb-5 merely prohibits fraud in securities trading.
See Karsch, supra note 2, at 292 (indicating that insider trading rule would alleviate ambiguities
of lOb-5); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting that lOb-5 does not contain
absolute prohibition against insider trading).
93. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 229 (stating that insider trading rule would offer
SEC and courts effective device to deter outsiders from trading on inside information). Mr.
Freeman maintained that legislation prohibiting outsiders from trading on inside information
would not adversely affect the SEC's enforcement of the insider trading laws. Id.
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Congress should pass legislation that clarifies when outsiders incur 1Ob-5
liability.
94
While a potential insider trading definition could be based on the market
information theory,95 the Supreme Court's fiduciary duty approach, 96 or the
misappropriation theory, 97 Congress should incorporate the SEC's holding
in Cady Roberts which combined the outsider's relationship with the issuing
corporation with principles of fairness to transform the outsider into a
traditional insider into the definition of insider trading.98 An insider trading
definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady Roberts would define
adequately the prohibitions against insider trading because the Cady Roberts
analysis adopts the most desirable aspects of the market information theory
and the fiduciary duty approach.99 Congress should enact an insider trading
definition that premises insider trading liability on the outsiders' relationship
with the issuing companies rather than the outsiders' relationship with his
employer. 100 If a relationship exists that gives the outsider trading on the
inside information access to corporate information, principles of fairness
would transform the outsider into a traditional insider with disclose or
refrain obligations. 10' The fairness prong of the Cady Roberts analysis
94. See supra notes 63-93 and accompanying text (indicating need for comprehensive
definition of insider trading).
95. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (demonstrating how market information
theory offers alternative theory to Cady Roberts analysis as definition of insider trading).
96. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (discussing alternative approach of
fiduciary duty test announced by Supreme Court).
97. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text (indicating that misappropriation
theory offers alternative approach to Cady Roberts analysis as definition of insider trading).
98. See infra notes 99-151 and accompanying text (demonstrating how definition based
on Cady Roberts would define lOb-5 liability adequately).
99. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text indicating that Cady Roberts analysis
bases lOb-5 liability on existence of outsider's relationship with issuing corporation and
principles of fairness); infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (illustrating principle of equal
access behind market information theory); supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (discussing
how Supreme Court in Dirks and Chiarella required existence of fiduciary relationship between
outsider and shareholders of issuing corporation before imposing lOb-5 liability).
100. Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912; see supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (after
finding relationship between outsider and issuing company SEC in Cady Roberts extended
lOb-5 liability to outsider); supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (discussing how Supreme
Court in Dirks and Chiarella held that lOb-5 liability required fiduciary relationship between
outsider and shareholders of issuing corporation). The SEC implemented lob-5 in response to
a situation in which a corporate insider fraudulently misrepresented the corporation's financial
status. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 222 (indicating genesis of lOb-5). The corporate insider
purchased shares at a reduced price from the corporation's shareholders and made a profit.
Id. The insider was a traditional insider which suggests that lob-5 liability requires courts to
focus on the particular position of the person trading on inside information. See id. (noting
that corporate insider was director of issuing corporation).
101. See Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (stating that principles of fairness transform
outsiders with relationship to issuing corporation into traditional insider); supra notes 12-15
and accompanying text (discussing how SEC in Cady Roberts extended lOb-5 liability to
outsider because principles of fairness supplemented outsider's relationship with issuing cor-
poration).
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extends lOb-5 liability to persons with relationships to the issuing corporation
regardless of whether the relationship is a strict fiduciary relationship.10 2
The outsider, however, does not incur 10b-5 liability absent a relationship
between the outsider and the issuing corporation.103
Some academic commentary suggests that Congress should base an insider
trading definition on the market information theory.' 4 The market informa-
tion theory derives from the Second Circuit's broad statement in Texas Gulf
Sulphur that "anyone" who possesses insider information incurs disclose or
refrain obligations.' 5 Consequently, the market information theory imposes
an absolute prohibition of all trading on inside information." 6 Thus, the
market information theory extends lOb-5 liability to any outsider who trades
on inside information." 7 The market information theory does not require
courts to examine whether the outsider defrauded shareholders of the issuing
corporation but, rather, proceeds on the premise that fairness requires that
all market participants have equal access to market information.0 8 Proponents
of the market information theory contend that small investors cannot com-
pete with outsiders who gain access to confidential market information.' 9
102. See Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (holding that traditional insiders do not
constitute only class of persons subject to lOb-5 liability); supra notes 12-15 and accompanying
text (SEC in Cady Roberts noted unfairness involved when persons trade on basis of inside
information obtained from relationship with issuing company). Modern financial complexities,
like mergers and corporate restructurings, extend the scope of lOb-5 liability beyond traditional
fiduciary duties. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 65, at 5, 2278 (noting that insider trading
problem increased with increase in mergers and tender offers); see also infra notes 119-21 and
accompanying text (indicating that increase in mergers and acquisitions increases number of
persons with access to corporate information who owe no fiduciary duty to issuing corporation).
103. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (explaining rationale for incorporating
Cady Roberts relationship test into insider trading definition).
104. TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION, supra note I, at 24. Proponents of the market
information theory contend that small investors cannot compete with outsiders who acquire
access to inside information. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, And Informational Advantages
Under The Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAgv. L.REv. 322, 346 (1979) (stating that outsiders
trading on inside information have unfair advantage). Relying primarily on a single issue of
fairness the court in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. stated a broad rule prohibiting anyone
who has inside information from trading on the information. See Brodsky, supra note 7, at
928 (indicating that Texas Gulf Sulphur court reduced focus of Cady Roberts analysis to single
issue on fairness).
105. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (noting that Texas Gulf Sulphur extended
lob-5 liability to outsiders to increase parity of information in stockmarket).
106. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (stating that market information theory
prohibits all persons from trading on inside information).
107. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text (discussing lOb-5 liability under market
information theory).
108. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 222 (proponent of market information theory stating
that Congress should outlaw unfair use of information despite absence of fraud to shareholders);
supra note 104 and accompanying text (indicating that market information theory does not
focus on fraud to shareholders); supra note 104 and accompanying text (Brodsky suggesting
that market information theory premises lOb-5 liability solely on principles of fairness).
109. See supra note 104 and accompanying text (noting that unfairness to small investors
provides rationale for market information theory).
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Proponents of the market information theory also maintain that the imper-
sonal nature of the marketplace is incompatible with a fiduciary duty analysis
of the insider trading problem."'
The market information theory's absolute prohibition banning "any-
one" with mere possession of inside information from trading constitutes
an unduly broad regulation of insider trading because the market infor-
mation theory potentially extends lob-5 liability to persons who have no
relationship with an issuing corporation or the corporation's shareholders."'
The market information theory arguably subjects analysts examining the
market and offering advice to clients to disclose or refrain obligations." 2 A
rule extending lOb-5 liability to market analysts based on the mere possession
of inside information would impair legitimate investment activities." 3 Market
analysts routinely interview corporate insiders to discern the financial status
of a particular corporation." 4 Furthermore, the interviews may form part
of the analyst's investment advice to clients.1 5 In offering investment advice
the market analyst, however, relies on his skill and judgment to supplement
the interviews rather than relying solely on his relationship to the company. "
6
Therefore, under a definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady Roberts,
110. See Karsch, supra note 2, at 284 (stating that fraud to shareholders is inappropriate
focus for lOb-S liability because sales of securities not transacted through face to face dealings).
111. See Karsch, supra note 2, at 284 (arguing that Congress should base insider trading
definition on market information theory); cf. infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (fully
discussing how market information theory hinders legitimate investment activities). Even
proponents of the market information theory state that the theory is overly broad. See Block
& Barton, supra note 7, at 371 (stating that although market information theory is too broad,
market information theory provides suitable starting point for rule against insider trading).
Some commentators maintain that private contractual relationships should govern insider
trading. See Carlton & Fischel, 35 STAN. L.Rav. 857, 863 (1983) (proponents of Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis contending that market adequately regulates insider trading).
Proponents of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis maintain that a prohibition against
insider trading is unnecessary because the market reflects accurately all information. R. BREAIY
& S. MYERS, Psritcid's OF Cosuo.ATE FINANCE 270 (2d ed. 1984).
112. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59 (recognizing that market analysts must have oppor-
tunity to analyze market information by questioning certain insiders); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at
233-34 (Court refused to adopt market information theory because not all users of inside
information harm securities market); see also General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403
F.2d 159, 167 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating importance of profit making nature of securities market).
113. See infra notes 114-16 and accompanying text (demonstrating how market infor-
mation theory inhibits legitimate investment activities).
114. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658 (noting that market analysts often meet with corporate
insiders).
115. Id. at 659. The Supreme Court in Dirks noted that the SEC recognizes the value
of market analysts.
116. Id; see also id. at 659 (noting that Dirks was unusual defendant because Dirks did
not need to apply personal skill to inside information). The Supreme Court in Dirks stated
that most analysts must use personal judgment to transform acquired information into material
information. Id.
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principles of fairness would not transform an outsider such as an analyst
into a traditional insider.1
7
While the market information theory is unsatisfactory because it may
extend lOb-5 liability to persons with no relationship to the issuing corpo-
ration, Congress should not base an insider trading definition solely on the
Supreme Court's fiduciary duty analysis."18 A definition focusing on tradi-
tional fiduciary concepts between the outsider and the issuing corporation
is incompatible with the complexities of the stockmarket." 9 Congress should
recognize that modern corporate strategies such as corporate takeovers,
mergers, and acquisitions necessarily require the assistance of third parties. 20
Third parties, such as investment banking and law firms representing the
acquiring companies, do not owe fiduciary obligations to the target com-
panies, but, nevertheless, acquire inside information concerning the target
companies.' 2 ' Equity dictates that the third parties refrain from trading on
the inside information even though third parties owe no fiduciary obligations
to the issuing corporations.I" Therefore, under the SEC's analysis in Cady
Roberts, principles of fairness would require that courts impose the disclose
or refrain obligations of lOb-5 on an outsider with no traditional fiduciary
duty to the issuing corporation, but with access to corporate information.22
The misappropriation theory, similar to the market information theory
and the Supreme Court's fiduciary duty approach, is unsatisfactory as a
basis for an insider trading definition because the theory distorts the
principles behind insider trading liability.'24 The Second Circuit's decision
117. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (indicating that certain outsiders use
inside information legitimately).
118. See supra notes 26-40 and accompanying text (indicating how Supreme Court in
Dirks and Chiarella held that outsider must breach fiduciary duty to shareholders of issuing
corporation before outsider could incur lOb-5 liability); infra notes 119-22 and accompanying
text (discussing inappropriateness of fiduciary duty test as basis for insider trading definition).
119. See Karsch, supra note 2, at 294 (stating that definition based solely on fiduciary
duty does not regulate insider trading adequately). The increase in mergers and acquisitions
increases the number of essential third parties, like investment bankers, to transaction who
acquire inside information, but do not acquire fiduciary duties. Id.
120. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (demonstrating complexity of modem
stockmarket). As an illustration of the complexity of the securities market, arbitrageurs earn
profits by speculating about the corporations that are takeover targets. Gelman, Powell, Pauly
and Cohn, The Secret World of Ivan Boesky, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18, 1986 at 60. The arbitrageurs
profit by buying shares of stocks of the potential target company because the price of the
target corporation's stock increases after disclosure of the takeover. Gelman, Powell, Pauly
and Cohn, The Secret World of Ivan Boesky, NEwsxvE, Dec. 18, 1986 at 60.
121. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (indicating how complex financial market
undermines usefulness of fiduciary duty test as standard to deter insider trading).
122. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (explaining inherent unfairness of
allowing certain investors to trade on inside information).
123. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (discussing how principles of fairness
transform outsider with no fiduciary duty to issuing corporation into traditional insider with
disclose or refrain obligations); see also Cady Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912 (stating that principles
of fairness extended 10b-5 liability to outsider who had relationship with issuing corporation).
124. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text (fully discussing how misappropriation
therory distorts lOb-5 liability).
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in Carpenter illustrates how the misappropriation theory overextends the
scope of lOb-5 liability.12 The reporter in Carpenter did not obtain inside
corporate information concerning particular companies. 26 Furthermore, the
reporter arguably did not occupy a position with access to corporate
information of particular issuing corporations. 2 7 Unlike the financial printer
in Chiarella, the reporter in Carpenter apparantly relied wholly on skill and
personal knowledge to execute trades on the market. 28 Although failing to
find the existence of any relationship between the reporter and the issuing
corporation, the Carpenter court extended 10b-5 liability to the reporter.
29
Therefore, the Second Circuit, applying the misappropriation theory, im-
properly extended lOb-5 liability to an outsider who lacked access to
corporate information of issuing corporations. 30
As Carpenter illustrates, the misappropriation theory creates confusion
because it extends 10b-5 liability to outsiders who abuse a fiduciary rela-
tionship with their employer to acquire inside information rather than
extending 10b-5 liability because the outsider abused a relationship to the
issuing corporation. 3 ' Similarly, in SEC v. Musella,132 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York extended 10b-5 liability
to a manager of a law firm who breached a duty of silence to the law
firm. 33 The Musella court found that the office manager's position at the
law firm allowed the manager to acquire inside information concerning
takeover targets when the acquiring companies solicited legal advice from
the law firm. 134 The Musella court found that, subsequently, the manager
tipped the information to corporate bond traders. 3 5 The district court in
125. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026 (imposing 10b-5 liability on reporter who did not
have access to corporate information); infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text (discussing
how misappropriation theory distorts 1Ob-5 liability by extending disclose or refrain obligations
to outsiders with no relationship to issuing corporation).
126. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031; see supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (describing
how Second Circuit in Carpenter disregarded absence of relationship between reporter and
issuing corporation).
127. Id.
128. Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 234 (indicating how printer in Chiarella used
position giving printer access to corporate information) with Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031
(demonstrating how reporter in Carpenter merely was analyzing stockmarket). See supra notes
112-16 and accompanying text (noting importance of not extending lOb-5 liability to market
analysts).
129. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026; see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text
(indicating that Second Circuit in Carpenter did not find that outsider possessed inside
information).
130. See supra notes 124-28 and accompanying text (fully discussing impropriety of
extending lob-5 liability to outsider who does not have relationship with issuing corporation).
131. See infra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (indicating how outsider without
fiduciary duties to shareholders violates lOb-5 by breaching duty of silence to employer).
132. 578 F.Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
133. Musella, 578 F.Supp. at 429.
134. Id. at 431.
135. Id.
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Musella held that although owing no duty to the shareholders, the office
manager breached a duty of silence to the law firm. 36 The district court
held that the bond traders inherited the manager's duty of silence.
37
Accordingly, the district court in Musella enjoined the bond traders from
participating in trades that would violate the '34 Act.
38
The Musella opinion announced a desirable outcome, but unnecessarily
distorted the scope of lOb-5 liability. 39 The court in Musella imposed 10b-
5 liability on the manager of a law firm because he abused a relationship
with his employer when he traded on inside information concerning the
firm's clients. 40 The SEC's analysis in Cady Roberts would require that the
Musella court impose 10b-5 liability because the manager abused his position
giving him access to inside information about the issuing corporation.' 4' In
a Musella-type situation an insider trading definition based on the SEC's
analysis in Cady Roberts would extend 10b-5 liability to the manager because
the manager occupied a position that gave him access to information about
the target corporations. 42 Because of the manager's position with the law
firm principles of fairness require that he maintain the confidentiality of
the inside information.
43
As application of the SEC's analysis in Cady Roberts to a Musella-type
situation illustrates, an insider trading definition based on Cady Roberts
offers a desirable outcome because courts will impose lOb-5 liability on
outsiders who unfairly profit from inside information when they abuse a
relationship with the issuing corporation and the corporation's sharehold-
ers. 44 An insider trading definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady
Roberts negates the need for the misappropriation theory and adopts an
intermediate position between the market information theory and the fidu-
ciary duty approach. 4 s While an insider trading definition based on the
Cady Roberts analysis would require courts to examine whether a relation-
136. Id. at 436.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. (imposing 10b-5 liability on outsider without finding that outsider breached
duty to shareholders).
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (indicating that courts should primari-
ly focus on outsider's relationship to issuing corporation before extending lOb-5 liability).
142. Compare supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Cady
Roberts analysis subjects persons occupying positions giving access to insider information to
10b-5 liability) with supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text (indicating that Musella court
subjected law firm manager who did not have duties to shareholders to 10b-5 obligations).
143. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (indicating that outsiders acquiring
corporate inside information but lacking fiduciary relationship to issuing corporation should
incur lOb-5 liability).
144. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (noting that Cady Roberts principle
does not use principles of fairness to extend lOb-5 liability to outsiders unless business
relationship exists between outsider and issuing corporation).
145. See supra notes 125-43 and accompanying text (discussing how Cady Roberts principle
extracts best aspects from fiduciary duty approach and market information theory to define
adequately insider trading).
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ship existed between the outsider and the issuing corporation, the courts
could recognize principles of fairness. 46 Application of the Cady Roberts
analysis to the facts of Chiarella illustrates further the intermediate standard
of lOb-5 liability provided by an insider trading definition based on Cady
Roberts.147 An insider trading definition based on Cady Roberts would
subject financial printers such as Chiarella to lOb-5 liability. 148 The Court
in Chiarella noted that Chiarella worked for a printing firm that handled
announcements of corporate takeovers. 49 Therefore, Chiarella occupied a
position affording access to information concerning both the acqiring com-
panies and the target companies. 50 Consequently, Chiarella should incur
disclose or refrain obligations by having access to the corporate information
of the target companies.' 5'
The SEC could amend rule lOb-5 to include an exact definition of
insider trading.5 2 Ideally, however, Congress should amend Section 10 of
the '34 Act to create uniformity in the securities laws.113 Although the SEC's
analysis in Cady Roberts provides a basis for adequately defining the
prohibition against insider trading, a new definition would require some
litigation.' 54 The definition would require courts to abandon the fiduciary
duty approach and the misappropriation theory when deciding insider trad-
146. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text (noting that Cady Roberts does not
use fairness principles to transform outsiders into traditional insiders unless outsider has
business relationship with issuing corporation); see also supra notes 127-42 and accompanying
text (noting that Supreme Court required that courts find fiduciary relationship between
outsider and issuing corporation); supra notes 107-12 and accompanying text (discussing market
information theory's reliance on principles of fairness).
147. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Cady Roberts
principle would extend 10b-5 liability to outsider such as financial printer who violates
relationship with issuing corporation).
148. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (Court refused to impose liability on financial printer);
cf. infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (illustrating how Cady Roberts analysis subjects
financial printer to disclose or refrain rule).
149. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. In Chiarella, although the Court found that the documents
omitted any reference of the parties to the transaction, the documents concerned both the
acquiring and the target companies. Id.
150. Id. at 224. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (demonstrating how outsider
financial printer in Chiarella occupied position with access to corporate information).
151. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (stating that Cady Roberts analysis
extends lOb-5 liability to outsiders in positions with access to inside information of issuing
company); supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (indicating that financial printer in
Chiarella occupied position giving access to inside information).
152. See Freeman, supra note 5, at 229 (suggesting that SEC amend rule lOb-5 to include
definition of insider trading); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1982) (SEC has authority to prescribe
regulations to prohibit manipulation on stock market).
153. See Karsch, supra note 7, at 297 (indicating that Congress had excellent opportunity
to amend Section of the 1934 Act to include definition of insider trading when Congress con-
templated passage of 1984 Act).
154. See H.R. REP. No. 355, supra note 65, at 2305, 33 (indicating that new insider
trading definition introducing new terms and concepts would require litigation to clarify
meaning of new terms).
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ing cases. 5 However, an insider trading definition would not present an
undue burden on the SEC's enforcement of insider trading.1 6 Congress
could alleviate the need for increased litigation by offering examples of the
types of activities that the definition covers and by providing examples of
exempted transactions. 57 Congress should rely on fact situations from the
various insider trading cases to clarify the insider trading definition.
5 8
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 premise liability on a duty to disclose.
59
The antifraud provisions of rule 10b-5, however, do not define the prohi-
bitions against insider trading adequately. 6° Recently, the SEC has conveyed
conflicting signals to investors concerning the scope of 10b-5 liability.' 6' The
inconsistencies in the SEC's enforcement of the insider trading laws reinforce
the need for a congressional statute defining clearly the scope of lOb-5
liability for outsiders trading on the basis of inside information. 62 Congress
should base an insider trading definition on the SEC's analysis in Cady
Roberts which focused both on the existence of a business relationship
between the outsider and the issuing corporation and principles of fairness.'
63
An insider trading definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady Roberts
would impose lOb-5 liability on outsiders who undermine the integrity of
the securities markets by trading on illegally obtained information.
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155. See supra notes 99-154 and accompanying text (demonstrating how definition of
insider trading would change existing law).
156. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Congress could
minimize need to litigate new insider trading rule).
157. See Block & Barton, supra note 7, at 371 (stating that legislative definition of
insider trading expressly could exclude beneficial investment activities).
158. See Dirs', 463 U.S. at 655 (Court considered whether market analyst investigating
alleged fraud incurred lob-5 liability); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (Court considered whether
financial printer incurred 10b-5 liability); Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1028 (Second Circuit consid-
ered whether newspaper reporter incurred l0b-5 liability); Materia, 747 F.2d at 203 (Second
Circuit considered whether to extend lob-5 liability to financial printer); Newman, 664 F.2d
at 17 (considering whether to extend lob-5 liability to investment bankers); Reed, 601 F.Supp.
at 694 (considering whether son who acquired inside information from father incurred 10b-5
liability); Musella, 578 F.Supp. at 431 (considering whether to extend lob-5 liability to manager
of law firm and tippees of manager); Lund, 570 F.Supp. at 1403 (considering whether to
extend lob-5 liability to outsider who obtained inside information after director of corporation
legitimately conveyed information). Congress should rely on previous case law to enact an
insider trading definition that is neither too narrow nor too broad. New Yorl L.J., December
10, 1984, at 42, col. 1.
159. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (explaining origin of disclose or refrain
rule).
160. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1986) (failing to clarify prohibitions against insider trading);
supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text (demonstrating how lob-5 does not define adequately
insider trading prohibitions).
161. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in SEC
enforcement of insider trading laws).
162. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text (emphasizing need for Congress to
enact legislation that adequately defines insider trading).
163. See supra notes 99-151 and accompanying text (fully discussing merits of Cady
Roberts principle as basis for insider trading definition).
164. See supra notes 104-51 and accompanying text (discussing how insider trading
definition based on Cady Roberts analysis would subject certain outsiders to lOb-5 liability);
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Congressional reliance on the Cady Roberts analysis would bolster confi-
dence in the marketplace without impairing legitimate investment activities.
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Finally, an insider trading definition based on the SEC's analysis in Cady
Roberts would offer outsiders guidance concerning the types of activities
that constitute insider trading and also would provide adequate deterrence
against outsiders who trade fraudulently on inside information.
6
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supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing how SEC uses 10b-5 to protect integrity of
stockmarket).
165. See supra notes 112-51 and accompanying text (demonstrating how Cady Roberts
principle would regulate outsiders trading on inside information and not inhibit legitimate
investment activities).
166. See supra notes 99-151 and accompanying text (discussing how comprehensive insider
trading definition would clarify existing prohibitions against insider trading).
